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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM 
The purpose of this study was to examine the degree 
to which subjective probability judgments conform to the 
Bayesian model of mathematical probability theory; more 
specifically, the degree to which subjective probability 
estimates for intersections of events approximate the pro-
duct of the subjective judgments for component events. 
Events were defined as concepts based on the uncertain rela-
tionships between experimental cues and classes. In general, 
the study followed the model of the probabilistic concept 
formation studies. 
The bulk of the literature related to probabilistic 
concept formation has its origins in the theoretical work 
of Egon Brunswik (1943,1947,1952,1956). The Probabilistic 
Functionalism Theory of Brunswik, as well as the Transac-
tional Functionalism Theory of the Ames group, views sub-
jects as operating in a complex environment in which cues 
associated with objects are not perfectly correlated. Most 
of our judgments as to whether objects are near or far, for 
example, rely upon combinations of partially valid cues. All-
port (1955), in discussing Brunswik's theory, states that en-
vironmental ambiguity adds to the uncertain cue-to-object rela-
tionships so that judgments are never better than a probable 
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achievement. An unconscious weighting process is suggested 
in which the object most frequently associated with the par-
ticular cues now presented to the subjects will be the most 
probable on the present occasion. Brunswik (1943) theorizes 
that the subject effects a compromise between the cues 
available on the basis of their respective trustworthiness 
and makes a "best wager." 
The two basic approaches to probabilistic concept 
formation have involved either correlation and multiple 
regression or the use of probability theory. The typical 
correlational approach has been to establish several cue 
dimensions which have predetermined correlations with a 
criterion variable. Subjects are presented with cues from 
the various cue dimensions and their task is to predict the 
criterion variable. Subjects are provided with feedback 
and experience with the cue-criterion universe. It is 
hypothesized that they will learn the correlations between 
the cues and the criterion variables. The extent to which 
the cue-criterion relationship is learned is determined by 
computing the correlations between the subject's responses 
and each cue dimension. 
The paradigm for experiments using probability have 
generally consisted of presenting subjects with different 
cues, each of which have a predetermined conditional prob-
ability relationship with two or more classes. The concepts 
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to be learned consist of the conditional probabilities of 
the various classes given each cue. The degree to which 
these probabilistic rules are learned is then examined on 
later test trials by having subjects perform tasks utilizing 
their subjective notions. 
Correlational relationships permit an examination of 
the use of cues for inferences about a group of objects or 
for repeated inferences about a single object. Whereas, 
probabilistic relationships allow for the examination of 
each object as a unique event. 
A correlational study by Summers (1962), using color, 
area, and position of a pointer as cues, and line lengths as 
a criterion, showed that subjects depended upon the cues in 
the same rank order as the cues objective validities, but 
that correlations between the cues and subjects' responses 
were low. 
In another study in which the cues and criteria were 
considerably more clear, Uhl (1963) obtained impressive 
results. Three rows of nine colored lights were used as 
cue dimensions and a row of amber lights in front of the 
subjects served as the criterion feedback. The correlations 
between the subjects• responses and the criterion feedback 
varied as a function of the validity of the cues. The mean 
correlations were from about .80 when the three cues had 
equal .57 relationships to the criterion, through .90 when 
the cue-criterion relationships were .oo, .45, and .88, to 
.99 when they were .oo, .01, and .99. The mean correla-
tions between subjects• responses and the cues closely 
approximated the objective cue-to-criterion correlations. 
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In general, the results of the correlational studies 
indicate that subjects can learn to utilize equivocal cues 
in order to predict related criteria. 
One of the earliest experiments using probabilistic 
cues was performed by Robert Goodow (1954). Airplane 
silhouettes were classified into one of two classes (X or 
not-X) on the basis of three cues: wing shape, air scoop 
location, and tail shape. Subjects were given one cue with 
a probability of 1.00 on each trial and two cues which indi-
cated the correct answer .67 of the time. The cues in this 
case were presented singly. On the fifth block of 100 
trials subjects' responses followed the 1.00 cue about .89 
of the time and the .67 cues about .86 of the time. When 
subjects were presented with two cues, one a 1.00 cue and 
the other a .67 cue and both cues pointed to the same answer, 
the answers were almost always the one indicated, i.e., 
the results were comparable to the use of a 1.00 cue alone. 
However, when the 1.00 and .67 cues were in conflict, 
subjects tended to follow the 1.00 cue only .87 of the 
time. The conflicting cues seemed to reduce certainty, 
but it was noted that subjects tended to rely on 
the 1.00 cue more and more as the number of trials 
increased. 
When subjects were given two cues which were both 
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.67 cues and which both pointed to the same answer, they 
gave that answer .90 of the time. When these two cues were 
in conflict, subjects gave the answer indicated by each .50 
of the time. These results appear to confirm the notion 
that subjects can perform reasonably well in a probabilistic 
concept formation situation. 
In a more complex experiment, Beach (1964) had sub-
jects learn to predict to which of three classes each of a 
set of 120 cards belonged. The predictions were based on the 
cards' three cue values which were from three nine-valued 
cue dimensions. After the subjects had been presented a card 
and had made a judgment about its class membership, they were 
told the correct class. It was hypothesized that subjects 
would learn the probability relationships between the mul-
tiple cues and the classes. Special cue combinations for 
which the frequency of association values led to a class 
choice which was not the one designated as correct by the 
feedback were scattered throughout the deck of cards. It 
was found that subjects made persistent errors on these 
infirming cards during the first part of the experiment. 
The errors, for the most part, constituted the substitution 
of the probability based class choice, which indicates that 
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probabilities were being utilized. From the beginning, the 
subjeot•s responses for the cards which possessed cues pre-
dicting the actual class of assignment were increasingly in 
the direction of the correct class. During the later part 
of the experiment, evidence of subject recognition occurred 
and all of the responses tended to be the class given as 
correct. There were 1440 training trials in the experiment 
which may have been too many in light of possible card 
memorization. The number of times the subjects saw a single 
card was not reported. 
The influence of probabilism was also checked after 
the training trials when subjects were shown test cards 
possessing combinations of two and three cues. The combi-
nations had not been used during the training period. The 
subjects were ask~d to choose a "best bet" for the correct 
class. The subjects' class choices were compared to the 
probability distributions computed by adding the percentage 
of times the cues were associated with each class during 
the training trials. For 10 test cards out of 14, subjects 
chose the class having the highest past association, i.e., 
the "best bet." A second experiment using 12 valued cue 
dimensions and five classes yielded similar results. These 
findings support the notion that subjects can learn prob-
ability relationships. 
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While the results of the probabilistic concept forma-
tion studies indicate that subjects can become quite accur-
ate over time, they do not expose the process of learning 
the relationships, i.e., the mechanics of the compromise. 
When the subject is first gaining knowledge about the exper-
imental universe, his judgments cannot be expected to con-
form to the established experimental probability relation-
ships. If these inaccurate subjective estimates reflect 
the subject's actual subjective evaluation of the cue-class 
relationships, and if subjects are good intuitive statisti-
cians, as Brunswik has suggested, then we might expect to 
find that the inter-relations among subjective probability 
estimates would be consistent in terms of some model. That 
is, we would expect an orderly compromise on the basis of a 
subject's subjective estimates of the data. The specific 
manner in which we could expect to find these consistencies 
among subjective probabilities is open to question. 
A new and rapidly developing area of research and 
application viewing men as probabilistic information proces-
sors is based on Bayesian statistics. Bayes's theorem is 
said to be the appropriate normative model defining the 
manner in which humans function as intuitive statisticians. 
A normative model, according to Edwards, Lindman, and Phil-
lips (1965) is "a set of rules specifying what people should 
do; a normative model for decision making then, specifies what 
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decision you should make." The equation is: 
P(HJD) = P(Df H) P(H) 
P(D) (1) 
Where the P(H) is the prior probability of the hypothesis 
under consideration being correct; the P(DIH) is the prob-
ability of the data being associated with the hypotheses, 
the P(D) is the prior probability of the data occuring, and 
the P(HID) is the revised posterior probability that the 
hypothesis is correct, given the data associated with it. 
Bayes's theorem, which permits the revision of 
opinions on the basis of new information, has been used very 
little in the past. This is largely because of the diffi-
culty in making probability judgments prior to the collec-
tion of data. 
According to Stilson (1966), the Bayesian approach 
has been reappraised within the past decade and a group of 
statisticians and psychologists referred to as the neo-
Bayesians have emerged. The neo-Bayesians obtain the prior 
probabilities by looking to the knowledge, experience, and 
intuition of an individual to assign subjective prior prob-
abilities. Stilson (1966) raises the question about the 
mathematical rules for subjective probabilities, i.e., when 
subjective and objective probabilities are combined in one 
mathematical formula, as the nee-Bayesian does when he 
applies Bayes Theorem, the assumption is made that 
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subjective probabilities combine according to the same 
rules of mathematical probability theory as the objective 
probabilities do. This same question can be raised in the 
event that subjective probabilities alone are combined in 
the manner prescribed by Bayes 1 s Theorem. By examining the 
degree to which subjective probability judgments conform to 
the Bayesian model, the present study assumes that subjec-
tive probabilities obey the mathematic rules. Studies 
investigating this assumption submit subjective probabili-
ties to the specific rules of probability theory. Two such 
rules are: (1) the sum of all outcome probabilities in a 
given sample space must be unity; (2) the sum of the prob-
abilities of the outcomes contained in an event equals the 
probability of that event. 
Subjective probability, as used here, refers to what 
Edwards, et al (1965), call the "personalistic view." An 
individual's statement of probability is said to be a matter 
of opinion and is associated with that person only. This 
definition of subjective probability points to the specific 
person only insofar as his experience or data differs from 
the next person. It is implied that men have in common a 
method of information processing so that inferences from 
completely adequate data may be considered to be objective. 
While a person's initial opinion may differ from his neigh-
bor's, Edward et al (1965) suggests that both opinions may 
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be transformed to a series of relevant observations so as 
to become nearly indistinguishable. Edwards et al (1965) 
states that "the personalistic approach permits just as 
meaningful a discussion of the probability of a unique 
event as of the probability of a repeatable event." The 
present study and the related literature deal with the 
repeatable event in that there is a relative frequency link 
between data and hypothesis. Other studies involving sub-
jective probability, according to Edwards (1966), examine 
plausibility links, based on general verbal knowledge 
about the unique event. 
Beach (1966) reports a study utilizing Bayes's 
theorem as the appropriate normative model for how subjects 
revise opinions under the paradigm of the probabilistic 
concept formation studies. In experiment (1) by Beach 
(1966), revision consistency was examined. Revision con-
sistency, as used by Beach, refers to the degree of consis-
tency between subjects' paired cue estimates, and the 
Bayesian revision of their single cue estimates. More 
specifically, Beach defines revision consistency as the 
degree to which the two sides of Bayes 1 s theorem as shown 
in equation (1) approach equality when subjects' prior 
subjective probabilities are revised to obtain posterior 
subjective probabilities. 
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The equation that Beach used to revise single cue 
estimates involves a form of Bayes's Theorem which is based 
on the experimental procedure as well as the statistical 
structure of the experimental universe. The subjects in 
the experiment were made aware of the fact that the classes 
were equally represented and therefore equally probable. 
The known equal probability of classes plus the fact that 
the probability of a cue is, by definition, constant across 
classes, enabled Beach to define the Bayesian relationship 
between a single cue estimate of probability and the proba-
bility of the single cue being associated with the class as: 
P (Hld)o<. P (dJH) (2) 
which states that the subjective probability of a class 
given a cue is proportional to the subjective probability 
of the cue given the class. When there are several cues 
available and they are independent, the Bayesian equation 
for the multiple cue relationship is: 
P (H/d1, d2, d3)°' P (d1JH) P (d2IH) P (d3IH) (3) 
which states that the subjective posterior probability of a 
class given three cues is proportional to the product of 
the subjective probabilities for each cue given the class. 
Substituting from equation (2) into equation (3) yields: 
P (H/d1, d2, d3)o<. P (Hld1) P (Hld2) P (H\d3) (4) 
which states that the subjective probability of a class 
given three cues is proportional to the product of the 
12 
subjective probabilities of the class for each cue. Equa-
tion (4) shows the form. of Bayes 1 s Theorem that was used to 
combine the probabilities in Beach's study. 
In experiment (1) by Beach, twelve paid university 
students were run under three experimental conditions dif-
fering in complexity only. Capitol letters, numbers, and 
small letters served as cues and different colors made up 
the classes. Subjects were shown cards containing a combi-
nation of one cue from each of the cue dimensions, i.e., a 
capitol letter, a number, and a small letter, and the 
assigned class on the back. The cues were probabilistic 
indicants of the classes to which the card belonged. To 
construct the set of cards, Beach used a method which 
involved using a partial set of the larger possible set of 
cues. While this method does not produce independent cue 
dimensions, he justified its use on the basis of the limited 
experience the subjects were given with the cards. The 
method used for experiment (1) will not be explained; 
suffice it to say that Beach changed his procedure for 
experiments (2), (3), and (4) to include all possible sets 
of cues and that this revised approach was used in the pre-
sent study and is explained in the chapter on Method. 
Beach stated that the accurate knowledge of the prob-
abilistic structure of the deck of cards would constrain 
subjects to be consistent. It is for this reason that the 
experiment was designed to reduce accuracy. 
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The first experimental condition consisted of a deck 
of 60 cards, 30 in each of two classes; the second consisted 
of 90 cards, 30 in each of three classes; and the third con-
sisted of 180 cards, 30 in each of six classes. The sub-
jects were told that all classes possessed an equal number 
of cards and that presentation order was random. They were 
then shown the cards one at a time and asked to make judg-
ments about the class membership of the card on the basis 
of the cues shown. After the choice had been made, the cor-
rect class was identified and the experimenter proceeded on 
to the next card in the deck. This procedure was followed 
throughout the two presentations of the card decks for each 
of the three experimental conditions. These training trials 
were simply to provide the subjects experience with the 
probability based relationships of the experimental universe. 
After training, the subjects were tested on cards 
possessing selected single cues and pairs of these same 
cues. For the two-class condition, subjects were shown eight 
single-cue and three paired-cue cards; the three class con-
dition involved nine single-cue and five paired-cue cards; 
and the six-class condition had twelve single-cue and eight 
paired-cue cards. The single and paired-cue test cards were 
intermixed. The presentation was the same as during the 
training trials except that the correct class was not 
revealed to the subjects. The subjects were asked to 
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estimate the probability of each card belonging to each of 
the possible classes by sliding markers along a 25-inch 
unmarked metal bar. All three classes were estimated on 
one bar at the same time so that the probabilities would 
add to one. Subjects were asked to make a second set of 
probability estimates for five of the test cards in order 
to obtain a measure of reliability. Subjects were run indi-
vidually and for each experimental condition the five having 
the highest reliability were used in the analysis. 
By inserting the subject's subjective probability 
estimates for two single cues given a particular class into 
equation (4), calculating the product and correlating the 
obtained values with the subject's paired-cue estimate for 
the same class, Beach obtained a measure of revision con-
sistency for each subject. To evaluate paired cue accuracy, 
the objective training deck probabilities were substituted 
into equation (4) and the resulting posterior probabilities 
correlated with the paired-cue subjective estimates. Single-
cue accuracy was determined by correlating the objective 
single-cue probabilities with the subject's subjective esti-
mates. 
The revision consistency analysis for experiment (1) 
resulted in what Beach considered positive support for the 
Bayesian model. Beach eliminated seven of the twelve sub-
jects by reporting the consistency results on only the five 
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who obtained the highest reliability coefficients. This 
was done for each of the three experimental conditions. 
Whether or not the same five subjects obtained the highest 
reliability correlations under each condition, was not 
reported. The results of experiment (1), (Table I), show 
the consistency and reliability correlations for each exper-
imental condition. Of the 15 consistency correlations, 13 
are significant at the .05 level and above. Beach suggested 
that the lower revision consistency results for the six-
class condition probably resulted from the increased confu-
sion and opportunities for error when estimating probabili-
ties for six-classes. The single-cue accuracy correlations 
were, in terms of mean correlations, .46, .31, and ,34 for 
the two-, three-, and six-class conditions. The mean corre-
lations for paired-cue accuracy were .o4, .06, and .14 for 
the three experimental conditions. 
Experiment (2) by Beach (1966), directly investigated 
the hypothesis that fluctuations in the accuracy of subjec-
tive probability estimates should not influence revision 
consistency. This hypothesis was examined when accuracy 
fluctuated as a result of forgetting the probabilities and 
to additional training. The training cards from the three-
class condition were used. The training procedure was the 
same except that subjects went through the training deck 
four times instead of twice in order to permit some degree 
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TABLE I 
RELIABILITY AND CONSISTENCY CORRELATIONS FOR EACH 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION 
Experimental 
Condition 
Two-class 
Three-class 
Four-class 
Reliability Consistency 
Subjects Correlations Correlations 
1 .99 .94 
2 .97 .99 
3 .94 .93 
4 .92 .70 
5 .92 .95 
x .96 .94 
1 .92 .94 
2 . 87 .77 
3 .86 .94 
4 .97 .99 
5 .92 .95 
x .92 .94 
1 . 87 . 42 
2 .68 .68 
3 .92 .74 
4 .Bo . 42 
5 . 72 . 69 
x . 82 . 59 
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of accuracy. The subjects were 30 paid men university stu-
dents trained and tested in groups of about five at a time. 
The subjects were divided into a short delay group and a 
long delay group. Both groups were tested, using the same 
procedure as was used in Beach's first experiment. The 
short delay group returned one or two days later and the 
long delay group returned five days later. When they 
returned, both groups were tested again, given one training 
trial, and tested a third time. Although this procedure 
did produce a decrease in accuracy for the long delay group 
that was statistically significant, it was not as much as ex-
pected, and 15 subjects, some from each group, were asked 
to return two months later to take a fourth test. This 
attempt was also unsuccessful in that the resulting decrease 
in accuracy was not statistically significant. 
Beach's results (Table II) were reported in terms of 
mean correlations. It is interesting to note that the paired-
cue accuracy correlations actually increased over the two-
and five-day delay periods. Beach does not comment on this 
increase and simply states that paired-cue accuracy remained 
low throughout the experiment. The fact that the two-month 
delay resulted in less decrease in accuracy than the five-
day delay is also surprising. The mean consistency correl-
ations do not appear to be influenced by the only significant 
decrease in accuracy found over the five-day delay period. 
Test 
Short delay 
1 - 2 days 
Long delay 
5 days 
Test 
Two-month 
delay 
* p .005 
** p .01 
*'ft' p • 05 
TABLE II 
SINGLE- AND PAIRED-CUE ACCURACY AND CONSISTENCY 
CORRELATIONS FOR EACH DELAY PERIOD 
Mean Correlations Mean Correlations Mean Correlations 
for Single-Cue for Paired-Cue for Consistency 
Accuracy Accurac;y: 
I II III I II III I II III 
.49 .45* . 60 .19 .36 .38 .86 .87 .86 
·53** .38*** 0 52 .28 .35 .45 . 76 . 79 .87 
III IV III IV III IV 
. 54 . 43 . 44 .34 .94 .90 
f...J 
co 
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Beach correlated the changes from one test session 
to another in the subjects' reliability, accuracy, and con-
sistency correlations. The results of this analysis showed 
that the changes in single- and paired-cue accuracy from 
one test session to another were not related to increases 
or decreases either in consistency or in reliability. He 
did find, however, a significant positive correlation be-
tween changes in consistency and changes in reliability. 
The results, according to Beach, supported the notion that 
reliability places an upper limit on revision consistency 
correlations but does not dictate high consistency. He 
found that at high levels of reliability there were fairly 
large individual differences in consistency and that at low 
levels of reliability the results were biased toward low 
consistency. 
Experiment (3) by Beach (1966) had two objectives. 
The first was to examine the subjects' ability to revise 
displayed deck probabilities and the second was to see if 
the subjects' class choices for cards during training would 
correspond to their subjective probability estimates for 
these same cards. 
The revision of subjective probabilities was also 
examined in the same manner as experiment (1). A three-
class, two-dimensional universe was used and the subjects 
were 32 male students who were paid for their participation. 
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The available results show that for the 16 reliable subjects 
the mean single-cue accuracy correlation was .43. The mean 
paired-cue accuracy correlation was .31 and the mean revi-
sion consistency correlation was .79. 
To examine the subjects' ability to revise deck 
(objective} probabilities, the subjects were shown bar 
graphs of the actual cue-class relationships for single cues 
and were asked to make estimates of the probabilities for a 
card that possessed pairs of such cues. The results showed 
that 13 out of 32 subjects simply averaged the probabilities 
across the two cues for each class. The 19 subjects who did 
not average obtained a mean correlation between their revised 
paired-cue estimate and the Bayesian revisions of the deck 
probabilities of .96. 
The data for examining the relationship between class 
choices and paired-cue probability estimates were obtained 
from test cards interspersed in the fourth and last training 
deck. Sixteen reliable subjects made a class choice for 
each of four test cards during the fourth training deck 
trial and later were tested with these same cards and asked 
to make paired-cue estimates. The mean single- and paired-
cue accuracy correlations for the 16 reliable subjects were 
.43 and .31. Eighty per cent of the class choices corres-
ponded to the class later given the highest subjective prob-
ability estimate. The results further showed that 7 of the 
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16 subjects had all four choices correspond to their high 
estimates; for five subjects, three choices corresponded; 
and for four subjects, only two corresponded. These find-
ings, according to Beach, appear to support the notion that 
even though a subject's subjective probabilities are quite 
inaccurate, they are still utilized for decisions about a 
card's class membership. 
Experiment (4) by Beach (1966) examined whether or 
not subjects could consistently revise estimates for pairs 
of cues when only single-cues had occurred on the cards 
throughout training. 
Revision consistency in this situation was examined 
under the same procedural model as experiment (1), with the 
deck being presented six times. The subjects were tested 
by having them make bar graphs of their estimates for seven 
single-cue test cards and for six paired-cue test cards. 
Analyzing the data for the 8 reliable subjects (there were 
10 in the group), Beach obtained the following results: 
the mean single-cue accuracy correlation was .44; the mean 
paired-cue accuracy correlation was .50; and the mean revi-
sion consistency correlation was .76. 
In the discussion of all four experiments, Beach con-
cludes that the overall results support the notion that 
"subjects possess a rule for revising subjective probabili-
ties which they apply to whatever subjective probabilities 
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they have at the moment; whether the probabilities are de-
rived from experienced relative frequencies or from displayed 
probabilities, whether they are accurate or inaccurate, 
whether they have just been learned or whether they are the 
residuals of partially-forgotten values learned days before. 
Through all of these variations in the accuracy of their sub-
jective probabilities the subjects' rule remains unchanged. 11 
Beach suggested that the revision rule had been shown to be 
essentially Bayes's Theorem. 
In summary, Beach's support for the Bayesian model of 
revision consistency consists of three groups of subjects 
with high average consistency correlations and a minimum of 
five subjects who individually obtained significant consist-
ency coefficients. In each experiment only a certain number 
of subjects obtaining the highest reliability correlations 
were used in the analysis of consistency. The revision con-
sistency results of experiments (2), (3), and (4) are 
reported in terms of mean correlations ranging from .76 to 
.87. The results of experiment (1) show consistency corre-
lations on five of 12 subjects for each experimental condi-
tion. Because the possibility exists that the same five 
subjects were used for the consistency analysis under each 
condition, the results, while impressive, may be applicable 
to a sample of only five subjects. 
The present study was designed to investigate the 
Bayesian revision consistency results of Beach (1966). 
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While the investigation is not a replication of Beach, it 
does follow the general model of experiment (1) and there-
fore can be identified as an attempt to determine the extent 
to which Beach's results can be generalized. Specifically, 
the hypotheses were as follows: (1) Subjective probability 
estimates for combined-cue stimuli are highly consistent 
Bayesian combinations of the subjective estimates for the 
corresponding single-cue stimuli; (2) This revision con-
sistency will be high even though the subjects' accuracy 
is low when compared to the objective probabilities. 
There are several of Beach's experimental conditions 
which may have biased his studies in such a way as to 
restrict the generalization of his results. Questionable 
conditions include: (1) Beach utilized cues which probably 
did not form a "whole" when seen together. Even though the 
subjects were told to infer the card's class membership, it 
seems likely that they were seeing three individual cues and 
not the card as an object; (2) Beach had subjects estimate 
subjective probabilities in such a way as to insure that 
they would add to one. It seems likely that by fixing the 
subjective probabilities on the last class judgment for each 
cue, a certain amount of consistency would be expected, 
especially for the two- and three-class conditions which 
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provided the significant support for the Bayesian revision 
rule; (3) Beach examined consistency for the Bayesian revi-
sion of pairs of cues only. That is, he combined only the 
minimum number of cues using Bayes 1 s Theorem. 
In part, the design of the present study was an 
attempt to modify the questionable conditions of Beach's 
experiments. In this way, it was thought that the generali-
zations about the Bayesian revision rule could be validated. 
In general, the present design follows the model of experi-
ment (1) by Beach (1966) with the following modifications: 
(1) the experimental universe was changed in an attempt to 
have the cues when seen together form an object; (2) sub-
jective probability estimates were made by having subjects 
indicate number values along separate continuums for each 
class and the additivity of the values was left to their 
discretion; (3) revision consistency was examined for com-
binations of three cues. 
Beach utilized the form of Bayes's Theorem as shown 
by equation (4) on the basis that the subjects believed 
that the classes were equally probable. The basis for his 
study rests on this specific Bayesian equation, and his 
method of fitting events to the model. The present study 
consisted of two experiments designed to examine this posi-
tion. It is possible that even though the subjects in 
Beach's study were told at the beginning of the experiment 
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that the classes were equally represented, they migh.t not 
have been reacting accordingly during the test trials. In 
experiment (1) of the present study, an attempt to eliminate 
this possibility required subjects to report their subjec-
tive opinions regarding the class distribution, after the 
experiment. Because of the relatively simple (four-class) 
universe, it was hypothesized that most of the subjects 
would report equal class proportions. The subjects that 
reported equal class probabilities were to form the Bayesian 
analysis group. It was thought that if a sufficient number 
of subjects indicated that the classes were not equally 
represented, it would be profitable to compare their 
Bayesian revision consistency results obtained "illegally'' 
with the Bayesian analysis group, who fit the model. 
Theoretically, the Bayesian analysis group should do better. 
Experiment (2) of the present study incorporated Beach's 
method of advising the subjects about the equal class 
representation. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subjects 
The subjects used for experiment (1) of this study 
consisted of 43 college undergraduates enrolled spring 
quarter, 1966, at Central Washington State College. The 
subjects used for experiment (2) consisted of 14 students 
from the same population. All of the students participating 
in the experiment were satisfying a class requirement. 
Apparatus 
The experimental Universe consisted of sixty-three 
5 x 8 index cards. Each card had a cue value from each of 
three different multi-valued cue dimensions on its face and 
one of three possible class labels on its back. The three 
cues when seen together formed an object identified as a 
spaceman. The cue dimensions were: (1) the geometrical 
figures used for the body of the spaceman, (2) the colors 
of the body, (3) the shapes of the legs. Each dimension 
consisted of four individual cues which were: (1) the body 
shapes of square, circle, cross, and triangle; (2) the 
colors of red, yellow, blue, and green; (3) the leg shapes 
of dashed lines, wavy lines, straight lines with cross 
marks, and continuous lines which slanted out and curved 
up at the bottom. The classes to which the spacemen were 
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assigned consisted of the planets of Mars, Pluto, and Moon. 
(Refer to Appendix I for example drawings of the spacemen.) 
Dr. Beach, in personal correspondence dated March 
1966, provided a detailed explanation of his revised method 
for arriving at the cue combinations and the assignment of 
cues to classes. Beach's method, which was used for this 
study, involves the use of all possible sets of cues and 
assures independent cue dimensions. A three-dimension 
(4x4x4) matrix for the cue dimensions, body shape, color, 
and leg shape was used. Each cell of the matrix was ran-
domly assigned to one of the three classes in such a way 
that each class had an equal number of cells. The propor-
tion of cells belonging to each class was then calculated 
for each row and column. The proportions were the condi-
tional probabilities of each class being correct for a card 
possessing the cue associated with the row and column and 
constituted the objective deck probabilities. Because the 
combinations formed in this manner resulted in too many 
infirming cases, the class assignments were adjusted, which 
was in accordance with Beach's method. Infirming cases are 
described by Beach (1964) as being special cue combinations 
for which the relative frequency of cue-to-class association 
values lead to a class choice which is not the one assigned 
and designated as correct. Appendix II shows the cue com-
binations and class assignments that comprised the experimental 
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Universe. Table III shows the relative frequency breakdown 
of cue-to-class assignments. 
The entire deck of 63 cards was used during the train-
ing trials. The cards used for the test trials consisted of 
nine cards possessing single cues, three from each dimension, 
and three cards possessing combinations of three of the 
single cues. When seen in combination, the cues formed a 
spaceman. Because the training trial deck consisted of all 
possible combinations of cues (less one so that the classes 
had an equal number of cards), the three-cue combination 
test cards were obtained directly from the training deck. 
Appendix III shows the test trial cues and cue combinations 
in order of presentation. Five of the test cards were pre-
sented to the subjects a second time in order to obtain a 
measure of reliability. 
Subjects' responses were recorded on preprinted 
answer sheets. The response forms for the training trial 
consisted of the three classes, Mars, Pluto, and Moon, 
printed together and each group numbered from 1 to 126. 
The test trial forms consisted of the three classes printed 
together and numbered from 1 to 17· Under each number and 
extending across the page from each class was a straight-
line continuum with a 11 0 11 on the extreme left and 11 100 11 on 
the extreme right. (Refer to Appendix IV for the response 
form.) 
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TABLE III 
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONS FOR CUE VAilJES ASSOCIATED WITH 
EACH CLASS AND THE CORRESPONDING PROBABILITIES 
OF THE CLASSES GIVEN EACH CUE 
CLASS BODY SHAPE 
Circle Cross Triangle Square 
MARS: f 3 2 7 9 
P(Class/cue) .19 .12 .44 . 60 
PLUTO: f 8 10 1 2 
P(Class/cue) . 50 . 63 .06 .13 
MOON: f 5 4 8 4 
P(Class/cue) .31 .25 .50 .27 
COLOR 
Red Yellow Blue Green 
MARS: f 9 2 4 6 
P(Class/cue) .56 .12 .25 .40 
PLUTO: f 3 3 9 6 
P(Class/cue) .19 .19 .56 . 40 
MOON: f 4 11 3 3 
P(Class/cue) .25 . 69 .19 .20 
LEG SHAPE 
Dashed Wavy Lines with Lines which 
Lines Lines crossmarks curve up 
MARS: f 5 13 1 2 
P(Class/cue) .31 . 82 .06 .13 
PLUTO: f 10 1 4 6 
P(Class/cue) .63 .06 .25 . 40 
MOON: f 1 2 11 7 
P(Class/cue) .06 .12 . 69 . 47 
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Procedure 
The 43 subjects in experiment (1) met in groups of 
10 and 11. They were tested in their classroom during the 
regular class hour. The experimenter and an assistant sat 
side by side at a table in front of the room. A 10 x 36 
inch piece of white cardboard was placed upright on the 
table to shield irrelevant activity from the subjects' view. 
When the subjects were seated, the experimenter held up a 
blank 5 x 8 card and asked that they move to the front and 
sit in a position so as to be able to see the card clearly. 
When the subjects were settled and the answer sheets handed 
out, the experimenter read the training trial instructions. 
The instructions consisted of a general introduction to the 
experiment and an explanation of the task and experimental 
procedures. Subjects were told that the cards contained 
the information that they would need to tell where a parti-
cular spaceman came from, i.e., Mars, Pluto, or Moon. The 
task was to learn to use the information. Subjects were 
told that after seeing a spaceman, they were to classify 
him according to his planet by marking the preprinted answer 
sheet. It was pointed out that in the beginning they would 
be guessing, but that they were to make a choice regardless. 
(Refer to Appendix V for the specific instructions.) The 
experimenter responded to questions and the training trials 
began. 
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The cards were shuffled by the assistant and handed 
one at a time to the experimenter. While looking at a stop 
watch, the experimenter held each card above the cardboard 
shield for five seconds; the card was then removed from 
view for three seconds; the subjects were instructed to 
circle their answer; and the card was raised again long enough 
for the experimenter to identify the correct class. After a 
card had been presented, the experimenter handed it back to 
the assistant and obtained the next one. In this way the 
single deck was again shuffled and the experimenter was able 
to present the same deck of 63 cards twice. 
After the training trials, the experimenter read the 
instructions for the test trials. The subjects were told 
that they would not be able to see all of the spacemen on 
some of the cards. They were asked to estimate the prob-
ability that the information shown, i.e., part of, or the 
whole spaceman, indicated that a spaceman was from each 
planet. It was explained that the probability estimates for 
each class would be made by placing marks and number values 
(from zero to one hundred) along a continuum. A basic defi-
nition of probability was included in the instructions. (Refer 
to Appendix VI for the specific test instructions.) The 
subjects were given a sample trial and questions were 
answered. With the presentation of a card the experimenter 
said, for example, "Estimate the probability that the body 
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shape 'square' indicates that a spaceman is from Mars, 
Pluto, and Moon." Each card was held in view of the sub-
jects for 20 seconds. After the experiment, the subjects 
were given a questionnaire and asked to indicate their 
impression of the approximate number of spacemen from each 
planet. (Refer to Appendix VII for the questionnaire.) 
Due to an error in the experimental procedure, the subjects 
did not complete the questionnaire until six days after the 
experiment. A criticism of this procedure would concern 
subject recall. The questionnaire allowed the subjects to 
respond by stating that they could not remember, did not 
have an idea at the time, or that they believed the classes 
to be equally or unequally represented. It was thought 
that those subjects who indicated equal class proportions 
must have been under that impression at the time of the 
experiment. 
The procedure for experiment (2) was the same as 
experiment (1) except that the subjects were told in the 
training trial instructions that they would see an equal 
number of spacemen from each planet. The subjects for the 
second experiment were not given the post-experiment ques-
tionnaire. The 14 subjects in experiment (2) were tested 
as a group during their class hour in their regular class-
room. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
The purpose of these experiments was to examine whe-
ther subjects' pre- and post-revision subjective probabili-
ties are highly consistent in the manner described by Bayes 1 s 
Theorem. The model of experiment (1) by Beach (1966) was 
followed in that subjects were allowed only minimal experi-
ence with the probability based cue-class universe. In other 
words, revision consistency was examined in a situation in 
which over-all accuracy was expected to be low when compared 
with the objective probabilities. 
Four types of analyses were utilized: 
1. Reliability was evaluated by obtaining Pearson pro-
duct moment correlations between the subject's 
first and second estimates for the five reliability 
cards. 
2. Single-cue accuracy was examined by obtaining Pear-
son product moment correlations between the subject's 
single-cue estimates and the corresponding objec-
tive probabilities. 
3. Combined-cue accuracy was evaluated by obtaining 
Pearson product moment correlations between the 
subject's combined-cue card estimates and the 
Bayesian predictions for the corresponding objec-
tive, single-cue probabilities. 
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4. Revision consistency was examined by obtaining 
Pearson produce moment correlations between the 
subjects' combined-cue card estimates and the 
Bayesian predictions based on their subjective 
estimates of the corresponding single-cue cards. 
Out of the 43 subjects in experiment (1), 19 indicated 
that there was an equal number of spacemen in each class. 
These 19 subjects made up the Bayesian analysis group. The 
results, as shown in Table IV, revealed that only eight out 
of the 19 subjects obtained revision consistency correlations 
which were significant from zero. (Correlational signifi-
cance when not otherwise stated will always refer to signi-
ficance from zero with alpha set at .05.) There were 11 
subjects who obtained reliability correlations of .80 and 
higher (the .80 cut-off is arbitrary); only five of these 
high reliable subjects obtained revision consistency corre-
lations that were significant. A Chi square test of signi-
ficance on the number of high reliable subjects who obtained 
significant and non-significant consistency correlations 
showed that a null hypothesis of a 50:50 proportion could 
not be rejected. The mean revision consistency correlation 
for all of the 19 subjects was .53. The mean consistency 
correlation for the 11 high reliable subjects was .55. 
The 19 subjects in the Bayesian analysis group obtained 
a mean reliability correlation of .73. Out of the 19 
TABLE IV 
RELIABILI~ ACCURACY, AND CONSISTENCY CORRELATIONS FOR EACH 
SUBJECT IN THE BAYESIAN ANALYSIS GROUP 
Single-cue Combined-cue 
Subjects Reliability Accuracy Accuracy Consistency 
No. of Estimates 15 27 9 9 
1 .88** .34* . 32 .94** 
2 1.00** .60** ·90** ·99** 
3 ·91** ·33* .22 .35 
4 .96** .46** -.32 .36 
5 ·90** .41* . 65* .57 6 .54*- .17 .36 . 51 
7 . 86il'* ·53** ·59* .68* 
8 .81** .02 -.001 . 41 
9 .74** ·37* . 63* .61* 
10 .94** .41* . 50 .10 
11 .96** . 40* .10 .17 
12 . 7frt* .25 -.22 .81** 
13 .85** .43* . 45 .83** 
14 . 47* .25 -.02 .34 
15 ·95** .09 -.13 . 64* 
16 .47* .43* . 45 .78** 
17 . 42 .44* 0 90** . 30 
18 .21 .20 ·91** . 50 
19 .21 . 60** . 72* .25 
x .73 .35 .37 .53 
*i' ~ . 05 
**P S. .01 
VJ 
\J1 
reliability correlations, 16 were significant at the .05 
level and above. The mean single-cue accuracy correlation 
was .35. Although 13 of the 19 single-cue accuracy corre-
lations were significant, their magnitudes tended to be 
quite low. The mean combined-cue accuracy correlation was 
.37. In this case, 7 out of the 19 were significant. 
The results for the non-Bayesian analysis group are 
shown in Table v. Out of the 43 subjects in the experiment, 
18 indicated that they believed that there was not an equal 
number of spacemen in each class. Out of the 18 subjects, 
8 obtained consistency correlations that were significant 
at the .05 level and above. There were 10 out of the 18 
subjects who attained reliability correlations greater than 
.60. Five of the 10 high reliable subjects obtained signi-
ficant consistency correlations. The mean revision con-
sistency correlation for all of the subjects was .50; for 
the high reliable subjects it was .53. 
Significant reliability correlations were obtained 
by 13 out of the 18 subjects in the non-Bayesian analysis 
group. The mean reliability correlation was .59. Although 
eight subjects obtained significant single-cue accuracy 
correlations, they tended to be quite low, which is reflected 
by the mean correlation of .28. Significant combined-cue 
accuracy corellations were obtained by 8 out of the 18 
subjects. The mean combined-cue accuracy correlation was .47. 
TABLE V 
RELIABILITY, ACCURACY, AND CONSISTENCY CORRELATIONS FOR EACH 
SUBJECT OF THE NON-BAYESIAN ANALYSIS GROUP 
Single-cue Combined-cue 
Subjects Reliabilitl Accuracl Accuracl Consistencl 
No. of Estimates 15 27 9 9 
1 . 31 . 30 . 69* ·70* 
2 .34 .36* -.13 .43 
3 ·53* .10 -.07 ·73* 4 0 90** .40* .26 .81** 
5 .54* .27 .91** -.27 6 .62** .19 . 32 .35 
7 .17 -.13 -.20 .46 
8 0 51* ·57** . 50 .56 
9 .88** .07 . 71* .14 
10 .33 .65** .92** .80** 
11 .31 ·33* .19 .28 
12 .62** . 30 .32 .46 
13 ·95** .25 .83** ·77** 
14 .67** .48** . 61* ·79** 
15 .62** .09 .91** .11 
16 ·91** .07 .36 .48 
17 ·75** ·37* . 39 . 66* 
18 .68** .41* ·93** ·75** 
x . 59 .28 .47 . 50 
*P ~ .05 
**P~ .Ol 
w 
-J 
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Six subjects indicated that they had no idea about the rep-
resentation of each class. These subjects were not included 
in the analysis of consistency. 
The results for experiment (2) (Table VI) appear to 
follow the same general trend as experiment (1). Out of 
the 14 subjects who were told that the classes were equally 
represented, 5 obtained positive revision consistency corre-
lations that were significant at the .05 level and above. 
There were 7 subjects who obtained reliability correlations 
of .60 and greater. Of these 7, only 2 obtained significant 
consistency correlations. The mean consistency correlation 
for the entire group was .30. The mean consistency corre-
lation for the high reliable subjects was .26. 
Out of the 14 subjects in experiment (2), nine obtained 
significant reliability correlations. The mean reliability 
correlation was .52. Ten subjects obtained single-cue 
accuracy correlations that were significant. These corre-
lations tended to be relatively low with a mean coefficient 
of .35. There were four subjects who obtained significant 
combined-cue accuracy correlations. The mean coefficient in 
this case was .36. 
It is interesting to note that out of the 57 subjects 
used in this study, 41 obtained reliability correlations 
that were significant. When considered in light of the 
considerably lower single-cue accuracy correlations, these 
Subjects 
TABLE VI 
RELIABILITY, ACCURACY, AND CONSISTENCY CORRELATIONS 
FOR EACH SUBJECT IN EXPERIMENT (2) 
Single-cue Combined-cue 
Reliabilit;y Accurac;y Accurac;y 
No. of Estimates 15 27 9 
1 -.05 .42* .54 
2 
·77** .42* -.54 
3 .80** .18 .63* 
4 .28 .38* . 37 
5 .70** . 34* -.29 
6 .47* .13 .19 
7 . 42 -.07 -.10 
8 .50* ·53** .55 
9 .91** .48** . 44 
10 .64** ·39* .46 
11 .64** .34* .82** 
12 ·77** . 66** . 86** 
13 -71** ·55** ·75** 
14 .18 .21 . 37 
x .52 . 35 . 36 
*P ~ .05 
**P ~ .01 
Consistenc;y 
9 
.67* 
-·59* 
-.12 
. 67* 
.20 
.54 
-.11 
·79** 
. 43 
.22 
. 48 
·97** 
.72* 
-.65* 
. 30 
w 
'° 
results seem to support the notion that subjects will 
utilize and stick with a subjective probability judgment 
even though it is quite inaccurate. 
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The responses for the 33 high reliable subjects in 
experiment (1) were grouped and evaluated in terms of a 
gross indication of direction. It was noticed that the 
class having the highest average probability estimate for 
the combined-cue card distributions corresponded to the 
class having the highest average estimate for the related 
single-cue test card distributions. In other words, suppos-
ing test card number eight consisted of a spaceman having a 
square shape, the color red, and dashed lines for legs. 
By adding the subjects' estimates for each class, i.e., 
Mars, Pluto, and Moon, across subjects and determining 
the mean of the distribution for each class, it was possible 
to obtain a gross indication of which class was considered 
the "best bet" by the group. By following the same proce-
dure for the corresponding single-cue test cards, i.e., three 
cards that possessed one of either the square shape, the color 
red, or dashed lines for leg shape, for example, it was 
possible to obtain another gross indication of what the 
group considered to be the 11 best bet. 11 It was found that 
the "best bet" for the combined-cue test cards corresponded 
to the "best bet" for the related single-cue test cards. 
The results are shown in Table VII. 
TABLE VII 
AVERAGE OF 33 SUBJECTS' ESTIMATES FOR THE COMBINED AND RELATED 
SINGLE CUE TEST CARDS FOR EACH CLASS 
Combined-cue Class Means Related single-cue Class Means 
Test Card {probabilities} Test Card Numbers {probabilities} 
Number Mars Pluto Moon Mars Pluto Moon 
4 .30 .37 ·39* 2,9,10 .33 . 39 0 39* 
8 . 63* .25 .20 3,6,11 .47* .31 .35 
12 . 32 .20 ·57* 1,5,7 .35 . 30 .45* 
* "best bets" 
+=-
I-' 
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It appears possible to predict which class (Planet) 
would be considered the most likely choice for a particular 
spaceman by simply adding the subjects' probability estimates 
for the cues which comprised the spaceman and selecting the 
class with the highest value. These gross indications sug-
gested that a simple additive model might account for the 
manner in which subjects combine their estimates for single 
cues. An analysis (Table VIII) correlating the subjects' 
subjective probability estimates for the combined-cue test 
cards with the average estimate of the related single-cue 
cards revealed that 17 out of the 33 high reliable subjects 
in experiment (1) obtained consistency correlations that 
were significant at the .05 level and higher. The mean con-
sistency correlation for the group was .63. 
The Bayesian revision model accounted for 8 of 19 
subjects in the Bayesian analysis group with a mean consist-
ency correlation of .53, and 5 of the 14 subjects in experi-
ment (2) having a mean consistency coefficient of .30. The 
additive model accounted for 17 of 33 subjects having a 
mean consistency correlation of .63. 
TABLE VIII 
REVISION CONSISTENCY CORRELATIONS FOR 33 RELIABIE 
SUBJECTS USING THE ADDITIVE MODEL 
43 
Subjects Reliability Consistency 
Number of Estimates 15 9 
1 .88 
-87** 
2 1.00 
·99** 
3 .88 .27 
4 .91 .38 
5 .96 .57 6 .90 ·77** 
7 .54 . 39 
8 .86 . 72* 
9 .53 .76** 
10 .90 .87** 
11 .54 -.38 
12 . 62 .16 
13 . 70 .10 
14 .81 .41 
15 .51 . 52 
16 .88 .25 
17 .74 .66* 
18 .94 . 39 
19 .71 .60* 
20 .96 . 47 
21 . 62 .65* 
22 .95 ·75** 
23 .73 .80** 
24 .73 .67* 
25 .67 ·79** 
26 .76 .76** 
27 . 62 .34 
28 .92 . 35 
29 .85 .83** 
30 .76 ·77** 
31 .68 ·77** 
32 .76 . 18 
33 .95 .57 
x . 63 
*P ~ .05 
**PS... .01 
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of these studies was to provide a basis 
for generalizing the results of an experiment (1) by Beach 
(1966). The relationship between subjects' subjective prob-
ability estimates for combinations of cues and estimates for 
the single cues which comprised the combinations formed the 
basis for the study. Beach suggests, on the basis of his 
results, that this relationship is essentially Bayes 1 s 
Theorem. 
In order to validate and provide evidence upon which 
to further generalize the application of Bayes 1 s Theorem in 
this type of experimental setting, it is necessary to define 
more specifically the results that can be interpreted as 
being in support of the position. When Bayes 1 s Theorem is 
hypothesized to be the appropriate normative model for how 
opinions are revised, it must be assumed to be applicable 
to all persons. In other words, it is posited that all men 
are intuitive staticians and have in common a Bayesian methed 
of information processing. This is not to say that experi-
mentally every subject must be highly consistent; certainly 
individual differences in attitude and interest in the 
experiment, for example, would allow for a few subjects to 
function in ways other than would be predicted by Bayes's 
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Theorem. In utilizing the technique of correlation to 
determine the degree of Bayesian consistency, the level of 
the correlation coefficient that is to be labled "highly 
consistent" must be determined. Because there is no evi-
dence upon which to base a specified value of the population 
correlation, ''highly consistent" should meet the minimal 
requirement of being significantly greater than zero. In 
summary, experimental evidence which is to be interpreted 
as being in support of the Bayesian revision rule must con-
sist of most subjects obtaining consistency correlations 
that are significant. 
The present investigation follows the general model 
of Beach's study in that subjects were allowed only suffi-
cient experience with the experimental universe to develop 
some inaccurate notions about the probabilistic rules which 
linked cues to classes. The results show that this was 
accomplished in that the correlations between the subjects' 
estimates and the objective probabilities tended to be quite 
low. The mean single-cue accuracy correlations were .35, 
.47 and .36 for the three experimental groups. A comparison 
of these findings with the accuracy results of Beach is of 
no concern since the rational for having subjects attain 
only a minimal amount of accuracy was based on Beach's posi-
tion that high accuracy would constrain subjects to be con-
sistent. In other words, as long as the accuracy is not 
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high across subjects, the model of Beach's study is upheld. 
The single-cue accuracy for the present study, while 
slightly lower across subjects, compares quite favorably 
with the results of Beach. The combined-cue accuracy 
attained by the subjects in the present study was somewhat 
higher than in Beach's investigation. 
The use of a reliability control in the present study 
was necessary in order to identify subjects who were simply 
writing down numbers at random. An examination of the pro-
tocols for the 16 subjects in experiment (1) who obtained 
reliability correlations of .80 and higher, revealed that 
the test-retest measurement involved something more than 
the subjects simply remembering earlier response. Only one 
subject had stereotyped all five of his responses; another 
stereotyped four responses; four subjects made identical 
estimates on two reliability cards and one subject on one 
card. The remaining nine subjects gave responses which 
were linearly related but which were not alike. These 
observations only add support to the notion that subjects 
will utilize a subjective judgment, even though inaccurate, 
and stick with it, without, in most cases, simply remember-
ing their earlier response. Certainly, stereotyped responses 
cannot be considered a weakness of the measurement in that 
the subjects may have been honestly expressing their judg-
ment rather than trying to outguess the experiment. As was 
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previously stated, 41 out of the 57 subjects participating 
in the experiments attained reliability coefficients that 
were significant. When considered in light of the low 
single-cue accuracy correlations, these results also seem 
to support the notion that subjects will utilize and stick 
with an inaccurate subjective probability judgment. 
Although it was necessary to define significant reliability 
in terms of a zero correlation, the results have been writ-
ten to include only the highest obtained reliability coeffi-
cients for the experimental groups. This was done to more 
closely approximate the reliabilities associated with the 
Bayesian consistency results of Beach. 
Two experiments were run to test the hypothesis of the 
Bayesian revision rule. As in Beach's study, the experimen-
tal procedures were designed to fit the requirements of 
the particular form of Bayes's Theorem that was utilized. 
The equation is: 
P 1 (H/d1, d2, d3 ) O<. P (H/d1) P (HJct2 ) P (Hld3) 
which states that the subjective probability of a class 
given three cues is proportional to the product of the sub-
jective probabilities of the class given each cue. In 
order to justify using this equation, it is necessary that 
the subjects consider the classes to be equally represented 
and therefore having an equal probability of occurring in 
the deck. It is only in this way that the probability of a 
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class can be removed from the basic equation. Experiment 
(1) of the present study assured that the subjects believed 
that the classes were equally probable by including a proce-
dure in which the subjects were asked after the experiment 
to state their opinion. Those 19 subjects fitting the model 
of the Bayesian equation were labled the Bayesian analysis 
group. There were 18 subjects who indicated that the 
classes were not equally represented and these subjects con-
stituted the non-Bayesian group. Experiment (2) consisted 
of 14 subjects who were told at the beginning of the experi-
ment that they would see an equal number of cards from each 
class. 
The results for the Bayesian analysis group do not 
meet the requirements for support of the Bayesian revision 
rule. Out of the 11 subjects who obtained reliability 
correlations of .80 and higher, only 5 had consistency cor-
relations that were significant from zero. A Chi square 
test showed that a null hypothesis of a 50:50 proportion 
could not be rejected. These results are distant enough 
from the "all-men" requirement of a normative model to be 
considered negative. 
The results of experiment (2) do not support the 
hypothesis of the Bayesian revision rule. Of the seven sub-
jects who obtained reliability correlations of .60 and 
higher, only two had consistency correlations that were 
significant. 
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In conclusion, the results do not support the hypo-
thesis. Subjective probabilities for the combined-cue 
stimuli cannot be said to be highly consistent Bayesian 
combinations of the subjective estimates for the corres-
ponding single-cue stimuli. 
The present experiments differed from the experiment 
by Beach (1966) in several significant ways: (1) a differ-
ent type of cue-class universe was used; (2) subjective 
probabilities were not forced to add to unity; and (3) 
revision consistency was examined for combinations of three 
cues rather than two. 
Bayes 1 s Theorem is based on the fact that probabili-
ties add up to one. If Bayes 1 s Theorem was used as an 
equality, this condition would have to be met. In the form 
of a proportion, however, with the results defined in terms 
of correlation, the relationships will not be influenced by 
subjective probabilities which when summed exceed or are 
less than unity. Modifications (2) and (3) further compli-
cate the situation in an attempt to provide a basis for 
generalization, but should theoretically have no effect on 
the outcome. It could be argued, however, that the change 
in the experimental universe (from letters and numbers to 
spacemen) might account for the differences in the results. 
A criticism could be made of the experimental universe 
based upon the attention paid to the various cues that 
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comprised the spaceman. While one would expect subjects to 
pay approximately equal attention to the rather homogeneous 
cues of capital letters, small letters, and numbers, the 
expectancy might not be so high when using such diverse 
cues as geometrical shapes, colors, and various leg shapes. 
If this were the case, it would be possible for subjects to 
attain high reliability correlations, but the reliance on 
one or two cues would not result in high consistency as 
determined by the Bayesian equation. The present experiment 
does not permit a direct examination of this question. It 
would seem, however, that if the cues possessed varying 
degrees of attractiveness, a significant difference in the 
variances of subjective probability estimates across cue 
dimensions would ensue. For example, if colors are relied 
upon to a greater extent than leg shapes, then it would be 
expected that the variance between the estimates for the cue 
dimension leg shapes would be significantly greater than the 
variance for the color dimension. An examination of the 
variances for the various cue dimensions revealed that such 
a difference did not exist. The data were obtained from 
the 43 subjects in experiment (1). The results are shown 
in Table IX. 
It can be seen that there is greater intra-dimensional 
variance than between cue-dimensions. It seems plausible, 
therefore, that the discrepancy between the results of the 
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TABLE IX 
STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITIES 
FOR THE THREE CUE DIMENSIONS 
Cue Dimensions Mars Pluto Moon 
Colors 
Red .23 .19 .15 
Green .23 .24 .22 
Yellow .24 .21 .23 
x = .22 
Le~ ShaEes 
Type I .23 .24 .22 
Type II .27 .20 .21 
Tupe IV .23 .21 .25 
x = .23 
Bod;y: ShaEes 
Square .23 .20 .23 
Circle .21 .18 .21 
Triangle .25 .23 .25 
x = .22 
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present study and Beach's might be attributed to the limit-
ing factors in Beach's study. 
The consistency results of the non-Bayesian group 
compared quite favorably with the Bayesian analysis group. 
Even though the reliability correlations tended to be lower 
(mean correlation of .59 as compared to .73 for the Bayesian 
group}, out of the ten subjects who obtained reliability 
coefficients of .60 and higher, five had consistency corre-
lations that were significant. The mean, high reliable, 
consistency correlation for the non-Bayesian group was .53. 
Obviously the hypothesis of a 50:50 proportion is supported 
in this case also. At first consideration, these findings 
appeared to cast doubt on the form of Bayes's Theorem upon 
which the hypothesis rests. It seemed likely that not tak-
ing into consideration the differential class probabilities 
would constrain the results of the non-Bayesians toward less 
consistency. The fact that both groups obtained comparable 
consistency results appeared to place the specific equation, 
which required conditions that the non-Bayesians had not 
met, in serious question. If the equation is of doubtful 
applicability, then negative results would be meaningless 
in terms of the general Bayesian hypothesis. However, the 
tenability of the equation will be discussed in view of 
additional evidence. 
53 
The test card responses for 33 high reliable subjects 
in experiment (1) were grouped and evaluated. It was 
noticed that the class having the highest average probability 
estimate for the combined-cue cards, corresponded to the 
class having the highest average estimate for the related 
single cue test cards. These gross indications suggested 
that a simple averaging process might account for the 
manner in which subjects combine their estimates for single 
cues. The results of applying the additive model to the 
manner in which the 33 high reliable subjects in experiment 
(1) combined their estimates for single cues, show that the 
additive model can account for how subjects revise their 
opinions equally as well as the Bayesian equation. Of the 
33 subjects whose single-cue responses were simply added 
and then correlated to their related combined-cue judgments, 
17 attained consistency correlations that were significant. 
The mean consistency correlation was .63. These results 
could be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary to 
rely on the complicated Bayesian approach to information 
processing. 
Upon examination of the 17 subjects who attained sig-
nificant consistency correlations using the additive model, 
it was found that 14 of these subjects had also achieved 
significant consistency under the Bayesian model. Of the 
14, six were from the Bayesian analysis group and eight were 
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non-Bayesians. The fact that 14 out of 17 subjects gave 
responses which resulted in high consistency correlations 
for both the Bayesian and additive models shows very clearly 
the lack of sensitivity inherent in correlational analysis. 
It follows that rather than placing any high value on the 
results of the additive model, it may be best to question 
the use of correlation as the analytical technique used to 
identify the relationships. 
Apparently the numerical values of the subjective 
probabilities for most of the subjects were such that high 
consistency correlations could result from either an averag-
ing process or combining according to Bayes's Theorem. 
Table X provides an example of how this might work. 
It can be seen that the same relative position of 
the classes is maintained using both models. For correla-
tional analysis to distinguish between the Bayesian revision 
rule and the process of averaging would require the subjects 
to utilize more extreme or very low subjective probability 
values. Table XI provides an example of how this might work. 
It can be seen that while class (2) is the ''best bet" 
using the Bayesian model, the additive model predicts that 
the subjects will place the highest probability value on 
class (1) when the cues are seen together. 
Because of the lack of sensitivity in the present 
correlational analysis, conclusions regarding the applicability 
TABLE X 
HYPOTHETICAL PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR 
CLASSES GIVEN SINGLE CUES 
Class Cue 
A B c 
Ba~esian Model 
1 (. 30) (. 60) (. 50) 
2 (. 20) (.10) (. 25) 
3 (. 50) (. 30) (. 25) 
Additive Model 
1 .30 .. . 60+ .50 
2 .20+ .10+ .25 
3 .50+ .30+ .25 
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.090 
.005 
.038 
1. 40 
.55 
1.05 
TABLE XI 
HYPOTHETICAL PROBABILITY ESTIMATES FOR 
CLASSES GIVEN SINGLE CUES 
Class 
Ba~esian Model 
1 
2 
3 
Additive Model 
1 
2 
3 
A 
(. 80) 
(. 19) 
(. 01) 
.80+ 
.01+ 
Cue 
B 
(. 01) 
(. 65) 
(. 30) 
.01+ 
.30+ 
c 
(.Bo) = .006 
(. 20) = .025 
(. 01) = .00003 
. 80 = 1. 61 
. 20 = 1. 04 
.01 = .32 
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of the specific Bayesian equation to the experimental events 
cannot be made. That is, the subjects in the non-Bayesian 
analysis group who reported unequal class proportions did 
not have to incorporate their beliefs and could have 
obtained high consistency correlations by simply averaging. 
The five Bayesian subjects in experiment (1) who 
obtained significant consistency correlations were among 
the six subjects from the Bayesian analysis group who also 
reached significance using the additive model. It is there-
fore impossible to know what process these subjects were 
using to combine their judgments of single cues in order to 
make combined-cue estimates. The examination of the Bayes-
ian hypothesis is of course not influenced by these findings. 
In summary, the present study did not support the 
Bayesian hypothesis. Of interest, however, was the discovery 
that the experimental approach utilizing Bayes's Theorem as 
a proportion and evaluating the postulated Bayesian revision 
consistency relationship by correlational analysis may not 
serve to distinguish the model being examined from a simple 
averaging process. Support of the Bayesian hypothesis based 
on subjects' inaccurate subjective probability estimates 
could be of little value, depending on the estimates that 
were made. It seems likely that positive results might also 
be explained in terms of an averaging process. 
Future investigations, using the same experimental 
approach, should attempt to structure the subjective esti-
mates of the subjects. This could be accomplished by using 
objective probabilities which would distinguish between the 
Bayesian and additive models and allowing subjects to 
develop accurate notions about the probabilistic rules. 
Beach (1966) states that accurate subjective probabilities 
would constrain subjects to be consistent. It seems clear, 
at this point, that the model predicting the resulting 
consistency could depend upon the objective probability 
values. That is, certain numerical values would result in 
high consistency using either model and other values would 
serve to distinguish between them. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
The purpose of the study was to examine the use of 
Bayes's Theorem of mathematical probability theory as the 
appropriate normative model for the manner in which sub-
jects revise their opinions. The subjects' opinions con-
sisted of concepts formed about the probabilistic relation-
ships between experimental cues and classes. The cues, 
sented on 5 x 8 index cards, consisted of the physical 
characteristics, i.e., color, body shape, and leg shape, 
which made up a figure called a spaceman. The classes 
were the planets, i.e., Mars, Pluto, and Moon, to which 
spacemen were assigned. The physical characteristics of 
the spacemen were probabilistic indicants of the planets 
to which they belonged. 
pre-
the 
The 57 college undergraduates who served as subjects 
were given only sufficient training with the experimental 
universe to form inaccurate notions about the probabilistic 
rules which linked cues to classes. The training consisted 
of showing the subjects the cards possessing one of each cue 
and thereby a whole spaceman, having them make class judg-
ments and then identifying the correct class. After train-
ing, the subjects• subjective probability estimates were 
obtained for the class membership of test stimuli that 
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possessed single cues and test stimuli that possessed a com-
bination of three of these same cues. 
The specific hypothesis was: subjective probability 
estimates for combined-cue stimuli are highly consistent 
Bayesian combinations of the subjective probability estimates 
for the corresponding single-cue stimuli. Highly consistent 
was defined in terms of being relative in the manner des-
cribed by Bayes's Theorem. To evaluate consistency for each 
subject, three single-cue estimates were substituted into 
Bayes's Theorem and the resulting value correlated with the 
subjects' judgement for all three cues seen together. 
The basic Bayesian equation was reduced to a propor-
tion in accordance with a previous study supporting the 
hypothesis. The equation used is based on the subjects' 
believing that the classes were equally represented and 
therefore equally probable. Two experimental groups were 
used in the present study; one group was asked after the 
experiment to report their notions about the probability 
of the classes and the other group was told before that they 
would see an equal number of spacemen from each planet. 
The results of the study did not support the 
Bayesian hypothesis. In addition, it was discovered th.at 
the mathematical basis upon which the hypothesis was examined 
cannot, with any certainty, distinguish between the model 
being tested and a simple averaging process. 
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APPENDIX I 
APPENDIX I 
EXPERIMENTAL UNIVERSE 
The cues formed objects referred to as spacemen. The 
spacemen were divided into the classes of Mars, Pluto and 
Moon. The cues were the body shapes of circle, square, 
triangle and cross; the leg shapes of dashed lines, wavy 
lines, straight lines with cross marks, and continuous lines 
which slanted out and curved up at the bottom; and the body 
colors of red, yellow, blue and green. The figures below 
show all of the cues except those in the color dimension. 
I 
I 
I 
\ 
\ 
\ 
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APPENDIX II 
THE CUE COMBINATIONS AND CLASS ASSIGNMENTS THAT COMPRISED 
THE EXPERIMENTAL UNIVERSE* 
Cue Combinations Class Cue Combinations Class 
Al I Pluto Cl I Mars 
Al II Mars Cl II Mars 
Al III Moon Cl III Moon 
Al IV Moon Cl IV Mars 
A2 I Pluto C2 I Moon 
A2 II Moon C2 II Mars 
A2 III Moon C2 III Moon 
A2 IV Moon C2 IV Moon 
A3 I Pluto C3 I Pluto 
A3 II Mars C3 II Mars 
A3 III Pluto C3 III Moon 
A3 IV Pluto C3 IV Moon 
A4 I Pluto C4 I Mars 
A4 II Mars C4 II Mars 
A4 III Pluto C4 III Moon 
A4 IV Pluto C4 IV Moon 
Bl I Pluto Dl I Mars 
Bl II Mars Dl II Mars 
Bl III Moon Dl III Mars 
Bl IV Pluto Dl IV Mars 
B2 I Pluto D2 I Pluto 
B2 II Moon D2 II Mars 
B2 III Moon D2 III Moon 
B2 IV Moon D2 IV Moon 
B3 I Pluto D3 I Mars 
B3 II Pluto D3 II Mars 
B3 III Pluto D3 III Moon 
B3 IV Pluto D3 IV Pluto 
B4 I Pluto D4 I Mars 
B4 II Mars D4 II Mars 
B4 III Pluto D4 III Moon 
B4 IV Pluto 
*Cue dimension key 
Body shapes: Body colors: Leg shapes: 
Circle A Red 1 Dashed I 
Cross B Yellow 2 Wavy II 
Triangle c Blue 3 Cross marks - III 
Square D Green 4 Curved up IV 
APPENDIX III 
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APPENDIX III 
TEST TRIAL CUES AND CUE COMBINATIONS 
Test card no. 
l* 
2* 
3 
4 
5 
6* 
7* 
8 
9 
10* 
11 
12 
Cues and cue combinations 
Body shape--square 
Color--green 
Leg shape--wavy lines 
Body shape--circle, color--green, 
leg shape--dashed lines 
Leg shape--curved up lines 
Body shape--triangle 
Color--yellow 
Body shape--triangle, color--red, 
leg shape--wavy lines 
Body shape--circle 
Leg shape--dashed lines 
Color--red 
Body shape--square, color--yellow, 
leg shape--curved up lines 
*Presented to the subjects a second time for a 
reliability measurement. 
APPENDIX IV 
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APPENDIX IV 
INDIVIDUAL SUBJECT'S RESPONSE FORM 
Name 
Date 
Group 
1. MARS 10. MARS 19. MARS 28. MARS 37. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
2. MARS 11. MARS 20. MARS 29. MARS 38. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
3. MARS 12. MARS 21. MARS 30. MARS 39. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
4. MARS 13. MARS 22. MARS 31. MARS 40. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
5. MARS 14. MARS 23. MARS 32. MARS 41. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
6. MARS 15. MARS 24. MARS 33. MARS 42. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
7. MARS 16. MARS 25. MARS 34. MARS 43. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
8. MARS 17. MARS 26. MARS 35. MARS 44. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
9. MARS 18. MARS 27. MARS 36. MARS 45. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
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46. MARS 57. MARS 68. MARS 79. MARS 90. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
47. MARS 58. MARS 69. MARS 80. MARS 91. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
48. MARS 59. MARS 70. MARS 81. MARS 92. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
49. MARS 60. MARS 71. MARS 82. MARS 93. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
50. MARS 61. MARS 72. MARS 83. MARS 94. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
5la MARS 62. MARS 73. MARS 84. MARS 95. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
52. MARS 63. MARS 74. MARS 85. MARS 96. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
53. MARS 64. MARS 75. MARS 86. MARS 97. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
54. MARS 65. MARS 76. MARS 87. MARS 98. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
55. MARS 66. MARS 77. MARS 88. MARS 99. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
56. MARS 67. MARS 78. MARS 89. MARS 100. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON MOON MOON 
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101. MARS 112. MARS 123. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON 
102. MARS 113. MARS 124. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON 
103. MARS 114. MARS 125. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON 
104. MARS 115. MARS 126. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON MOON 
105. MA.RS 116. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON 
106. MARS 117. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON 
107. MARS 118. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON 
108. MARS 119. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON 
109. MARS 120. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON 
110. MA.RS 121. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON 
111. MARS 122. MARS 
PLUTO PLUTO 
MOON MOON 
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SAMPLE TRIAL 
No Probability Certainty 
MARS 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
PLUTO 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
MOON 0 100 
- - - ------ ------- - - - - - - - -
No Probability Certainty 
1. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
2. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
3. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
4. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
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No Probability Certainty 
5. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
6. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
7. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
8. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
9. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
10. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
11. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
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No Probability Certainty 
12. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
13. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
14. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
15. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
16. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
No Probability Certainty 
17. MARS 0 100 
PLUTO 0 100 
MOON 0 100 
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APPENDIX V 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRAINING TRIALS 
Most college men who are over 6 feet by 8 inches tall 
and who wear letterman sweaters are basketball players; but 
some are not. If we were forced to make a decision based on 
the information given, we would probably classify such an 
individual as a basketball player. Our daily lives are 
filled with choices based on uncertain information. For 
example, does tail wagging indicate that this dog is friendly? 
Does an east wind and dark skies indicate rain? 
This experiment will investigate how we make these 
kinds of judgements. It will involve a kind of game in that 
we are going to pretend that three spaceships have landed on 
campus. The spaceships are each from a different planet7 
one from Mars, one from Pluto, and one from the Moon. You 
will be shown cards containing pictures of the spacemen. 
Like this • • • • Each card contains some of the information 
you will need to tell where the particular spaceman came 
from, i. e., Mars, Pluto or Moon. Your task in the experi-
ment is to learn how to use the information just as you have 
learned that height and letterman sweaters are good 
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indicators of basketball players. 
You will see each card for five seconds. After I 
remove it from view you must immediately classify the space-
man according to his planet by marking the preprinted answer 
sheet. There will be a three second delay before I identify 
the correct planet so that you may be sure to make a choice. 
At the beginning you will have little upon which to base a 
choice; you will be only guessing; make a choice regardless. 
Even if you are not at all sure, answer each time. 
This is how it will work. Please do not mark your 
answer sheet. First I will show you the card for five 
seconds--do not answer during this time; then I will remove 
it from view for three seconds and say, "Circle your answer." 
You must mark an answer during this time. Then I will show 
the card to you again and identify the correct planet. 
Please do not mark your paper or change your choice after 
the correct planet is identified. It is important that you 
realize that while your task is to learn how to use the 
information provided, the information is of an uncertain 
nature. Just as with the cues that helped you identify the 
basketball player, they may be correct most of the time, but 
may also be wrong on occasion. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEST TRIALS 
In this part of the experiment I am going to show you 
12 cards. On some of the cards you will not be able to see 
all of the spaceman, i.e., you will only see certain parts 
of him. You will see only his body shape with no color; you 
will see only his leg shape and you will see his color with-
out being able to determine his body and leg shapes. On 
other cards you will see the whole spaceman. 
When you are shown the information on the card, 
whether it is part of, or the complete spaceman, you will be 
asked to estimate the probability that the information is an 
indicator for each class. In other words, if you see the 
color blue, for example, you will estimate the probability 
that "blue" indicates a spaceman is from Mars, then from 
Pluto, then from Moon. 
Don't let the word probability bother you. Even if 
you don't like mathematics and haven't had a course since you 
were a freshman in high school, you can perform these tasks. 
I will define the word probability for our purposes 
to be sure that we are all agreed on what it means. We will 
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use probability to mean proportion or percentage. To begin 
with, consider a deck of 52 playing cards. We know that 
the cards in the deck are of several different kinds. Sup-
pose that we are interested in the spade as a kind of card. 
The probability of a spade in the deck is the number of times 
this card occurs in the deck divided by the number of cards 
in the deck. In other words, the proportion or percentage 
of cards that are spades. There are thirteen spades in a 
deck of 52 cards. Thirteen is one fourth of 52, so the 
probability of getting a spade is 1/4, .25 or 25 per cent. 
Now consider a bag of 100 marbles--50 black and 50 white. 
What is the probability of getting a black marble? The 
black marbles consist of one half of all the marbles; there-
fore the probability of getting a black one is 1/2, .50 or 
50 per cent. What is the probability of getting a green 
marble from the same sack? It is of course zero, or no 
probability, because there are no green marbles. In a sack 
of 100 black marbles what is the probability of drawing a 
black marble? The answer is, of course, 1.00, 100 per cent 
or certainty because all of the marbles are black. If any 
of you are having difficulty with the meaning of probability 
you can think of it directly in terms of percentages. For 
example, you may expect to draw a white marble from a sack 
of half white and half black 50 per cent of the time. Are 
there any questions? 
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When you are shown the information on the card you 
will make your estimate of probability by making a mark on 
the straight line representing the full range of probability. 
Next you will place a number by your mark showing the number 
value of your estimate. Please notice that the straight 
line has a "O" on the left and a "100" on the right. Proba-
bilities and percentages are usually written with decimals, 
as they were in the examples I have given, with 1.00 being 
certainty. We are going to use 100 as the perfect probabil-
ity or certainty just to keep from using decimals. In other 
words, instead of writing .10 you will write 10~ instead of 
writing .90, you will write 90, and so on. If, for example, 
you were shown the body shape of a cross and you estimated 
the probability of this shape being an indicator of Mars at 
around one third, you would place a mark approximately one 
third of the way along the line and place the number 33 at 
the mark. Are there any questions? 
I will show you a card and ask you to estimate the 
probability that the information you see is an indicator for 
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each of the three classes. The card will remain in view 
during all three estimates. It will work like this •• 
I will ask you to make an estimate for Mars, Pluto and Moon. 
You will have twenty seconds and then we will go on to the 
next card. Here is a sample card to be sure you understand. 
Please mark your answers under the sample trial on your 
answer sheet. Each of you should have a mark and a number 
for each planet. Are there any questions? 
*l. Estimate the probability that the body shape square 
indicates a spaceman is from Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
*2. Estimate the probability that the color green indicates 
a spaceman is from Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
3. Estimate the probability that this leg shape indicates 
a spaceman is from Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
4. Estimate the probability that this spaceman is from: 
Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
5. Estimate the probability that this leg shape indicates 
a spaceman is from Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
*6. Estimate the probability that the body shape triangle 
indicates a spaceman is from Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
*7. Estimate the probability the color yellow indicates 
spaceman is from Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
8. Estimate the probability that this spaceman is from 
Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
9. Estimate the probability that the body shape circle 
indicates a spaceman is from Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
a 
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*10. Estimate the probability that this leg shape indicates 
a spaceman is from Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
11. Estimate the probability that the color red indicates 
a spaceman is from Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
12. Estimate the probability that this spaceman is from 
Mars, Pluto, Moon. 
*Ask the Ss to make estimates for test cards 1, 2, 6, 7, 
and 10 again. 
APPENDIX VII 
APPENDIX VII 
SUBJECT QUESTIONNAIRE 
NAME (important) 
In the experiment a total of 126 spacemen were 
identified according to the planets MARS, PLUTO and MOON. 
Try to recall your impression of the approximate number 
from each planet, i.e., did you think there were more from 
one planet than another or did you get the idea that there 
was an equal number from each planet? (Circle your answer.) 
A. There were more spacemen from one planet than 
another, i.e., an unequal breakdown. 
B. There was approximately an equal number of 
spacemen from each planet. 
c. Can't remember. 
D. Did not have an idea at the time. 
COMMENTS: 
